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The	 intellectual	 landscape	 of	 the	 humanities	 has	 since	 the	 1960s	 been	
overshadowed	by	the	question	of	identity	and	difference	–	political	and	national	
identity,	 ethnic	 and	 racial	 identity,	 gender	 identity,	 and,	 in	 philosophy,	 the	
question	of	the	identity	of	the	self	and	of	the	knowing,	acting	and	desiring	subject.	
This	 is	 partly	due	 to	 the	 social,	 cultural	 and	political	 upheavals	 experienced	 in	
different	 parts	 of	 the	 globe	 at	 the	 time,	 for	 example,	 the	 movement	 of	
decolonization	 in	 Sub‐Saharan	 Africa,	 the	 Civil	 Rights	Movement	 in	 the	 US,	 or	
second	 wave	 feminism.	 It	 is	 also	 due	 to	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 new	 intellectual	
orientation	in	French	philosophy	in	the	1960s.	Suspicious,	on	the	one	hand,	of	the	
claim	made	by	the	philosophies	of	the	subject	(particularly	by	existentialism	and	
phenomenology)	that	the	identity	of	the	subject,	although	not	given	or	natural,	is	
self‐constituted,	 and	 of	 the	 claim	 made	 by	 structuralism	 in	 linguistics,	
anthropology	and	psychoanalysis	that	there	are	invariable	structures	that	govern	
human	life,	on	the	other,	a	certain	unity	of	perspective	or	commonality	of	outlook	
emerged	among	various	French	thinkers	such	as	Deleuze,	Derrida,	and	Foucault,	
to	 name	 but	 a	 few,	which	 overturned	 one	 of	 the	most	 long‐standing	 beliefs	 in	
Western	thought.	This	is	that	difference	(or	variation)	is	not	to	be	derived	from	or	
understood	on	the	basis	of	a	prior	identity	(or	structure)	but,	rather,	that	identity	
–	whether	the	identity	of	a	singular	or	collective	subject,	of	the	self	or	of	a	people	
–	is	a	product	of	differential	relations.		
	
This	shift	of	perspective	has	had	significant	implications	in	the	discourse	on	the	
self,	 agency,	 and	 subjectivity	 in	 narrative	 theory,	 phenomenology,	 personal	
identity	theory,	politics,	anthropology,	 feminism,	cultural,	race	and	postcolonial	
studies.	This	book	explores	the	contemporary	effect	of	this	shift	of	perspective	in	
the	 debate	 on	 the	 self	 in	 four	 parts:	 Narrative	 Theory	 and	 Phenomenology;	
Politics,	Authenticity	and	Agency;	Feminism;	and	Race	and	the	Postcolonial.	
	
Part	 I	 of	 the	 book,	 Narrative	 Theory	 and	 Phenomenology,	 focuses	 on	 the	
contemporary	discourse	on	 the	 self	 in	narrative	 theory	and	phenomenology.	A	
brief	glance	at	the	discourse	on	the	self	in	the	20th	and	21st	centuries	will	quickly	
show	that	the	 ‘self’	 is	said	and	thought	in	many	ways.	For	some,	such	as	logical	
positivists,	behaviourists,	and,	more	recently,	eliminative	materialists,	the	notion	
of	the	‘self’	or	‘person’	(using	these	terms	interchangeably	for	now)	doesn’t	pick	
out	a	real	category	 in	 the	world	and	plays	no	role	 in	 the	explanation	of	human	
nature.	 For	 more	 recent	 analytic	 philosophy,	 by	 contrast,	 personhood	 is	
recognised	as	being	crucial	for	our	social,	moral	and	cultural	life,	and	the	person	
is	regarded	as	having	intrinsic	worth.	In	addition,	recent	work	in	cognitive	science	
has	 adopted	 the	 idea	 of	 the	 embodied,	 extended,	 embedded,	 and	 enactive	 self,	
whereas	phenomenology	since	Edmund	Husserl,	Max	Scheler	and	Edith	Stein	has	
focused	not	only	on	the	personal	nature	of	the	self	but	also	on	its	historical	and	
transcendental	character.	These	multiple	ways	in	which	the	concept	of	the	self	is	
used	calls	for	an	account	of	its	historical	origin	and	of	the	variation	of	its	senses	in	
the	history	of	Western	thought.	This	is	the	task	that	Dermot	Moran	undertakes	in	
Chapter	1,	“The	Personal	Self	in	the	Phenomenological	Tradition”.	Moran	traces	
the	development	of	the	concept	of	the	self	and	person	from	ancient	Greek	thought	
to	Kant	and	beyond	with	a	particular	focus	on	the	phenomenological	tradition	and	
narrative	theory.		
	
Narrative	theories	of	personal	identity	standardly	rely	on	the	belief	that	there	are	
good	reasons	for	drawing	comparisons	between	literary	characters	and	persons.	
They	 draw	 such	 comparisons	 to	 illustrate	 their	 thesis	 that	 we	 constitute	 our	
personal	 identity	 through	 the	 narrative	 by	 which	 we	 understand	 ourselves.	
However,	there	has	been	a	surge	of	criticisms	in	the	past	decade	against	making	
such	comparisons.	 In	his	contribution	to	this	volume,	“Persons,	Characters,	and	
the	meaning	of	 ‘Narrative’’,	Alfonso	Muñoz‐Corcuera	 considers	 these	 criticisms	
and	 proposes	 a	 new	 defense	 of	 narrative	 theories	 of	 personal	 identity.	 David	
Mitchell	tackles	the	problem	of	self‐deception	in	“What	does	self‐deception	tell	us	
about	the	self?	A	Sartrean	perspective”.	This	is	a	particularly	vexing	problem	in	
psychology	and	phenomenology	inasmuch	as	both	disciplines	sometimes	rely	on	
a	 common	Cartesian	heritage	 concerning	 the	 transparency	of	 the	mind	or	 self‐
consciousness.	Is	it	not	the	case	that	the	self	must	know	that	it	is	deceiving	itself	
about	something?	Must	it	not	know	that	the	lie	it	tells	itself	is	a	lie?	How,	then,	is	
self‐deception	 possible?	 Mitchell	 critically	 examines	 the	 Freudian	 and	
deflationary	accounts	of	self‐deception	and	shows	them	to	be	wanting.	He	turns	
to	Sartre	to	account	for	the	possibility	of	self‐deception	and	argues	that	it	reveals	
the	self	to	be	stranger	than	we	tend	to	think.				
	
The	question	concerning	the	nature	of	authenticity	and	agency	in	the	context	of	
political	and	ethical	action	and	behaviour	is	currently	a	fiercely	debated	topic	in	
the	discourse	on	the	self	in	both	popular	and	academic	literature.	This	is	the	theme	
of	Part	II.	Such	phrases	as	‘I	wasn’t	myself’	or	the	call	‘Be	yourself!’	suggest	that	
there	 is	 a	difference	between	 the	 ‘I’	 and	 the	 ‘self’	 and	 that	 in	order	 to	have	an	
authentic	 relationship	 to	 oneself	 this	 internal	 difference	 must	 be	 eliminated.	
Indeed,	 is	not	 authenticity	 in	 this	 sense	at	 the	heart	of	 the	political,	moral	 and	
social	 doctrine	 of	 individualism?	 It	 is	 also	 apparent	 in	 Cartesian	 rationalism,	
particularly	in	the	First	Meditation	of	the	Meditations	on	First	Philosophy	in	which	
the	reader	 is	asked	to	withdraw	from	the	authority	of	 tradition	and	that	of	 the	
senses	in	order	to	return	to	its	true	inner	self,	which	is	reason.	In	“Being	my‐self?	
Montaigne	 on	 Difference	 and	 Identity”,	 Vincent	 Caudron	 turns	 to	 Michel	 de	
Montaigne	 and	Pierre	 Charron	 to	 examine	 their	 account	 of	 authentic	 selfhood.	
Caudron	 argues	 that	 Montaigne’s	 Essays	 and	 Charron’s	 On	 Wisdom	 offer	 a	
particularly	stringent	critique	of	individualism	(and	of	Cartesianism)	in	that	the	
internal	 difference	 between	 the	 ‘I’	 and	 the	 ‘self’	 is	 not	 an	 obstacle	 to	 but	 a	
necessary	condition	for	authenticity.		
	
The	question	of	authenticity	is,	 in	the	conceptuality	of	Western	thought,	closely	
associated	with	the	question	of	agency.	What	conditions	must	someone	satisfy	in	
order	 to	 count	 as	 an	 agent?	Within	 the	Kantian	 tradition,	 self‐consciousness	 is	
typically	understood	as	a	capacity	to	be	reflectively	responsive	to	reasons	and	to	
have	an	objective	self‐conception,	that	is,	a	self‐narrative	or	practical	identity	in	
the	world	to	which	we	commit	ourselves.	Working	within	this	Kantian	tradition,	
David	Velleman	and	Christine	Korsgaard	both	maintain	that	self‐consciousness	in	
this	sense	is	a	necessary	and	sufficient	condition	for	agency.	They	distinguish	this	
model	 of	 self‐consciousness,	 which	 is	 specifically	 human,	 from	 first‐personal	
awareness,	which	they	believe	can	be	ascribed	to	some	non‐human	animals	too.	
In	“Specifically	Human?	The	Limited	Conception	of	Self‐Consciousness	in	Theories	
of	Reflective	Endorsement”,	Irene	Bucelli	questions	this	distinction	between	self‐
consciousness	 and	 first‐personal	 awareness.	 Bucelli	 argues	 that	 first‐personal	
awareness	is	already	specifically	human	inasmuch	as	it	involves	a	relation	of	self‐
reference	(or	a	sense	of	ownership)	that	does	not	entail	the	objective	notion	of	a	
person	 and	 that	 can	 also	 not	 be	 attributed	 to	 animals,	 and,	moreover,	 that	 an	
objective	self‐conception	is	not	simply	added	on	to	this	specifically	human	first‐
personal	awareness	but,	rather,	that	it	thoroughly	modifies	it.							
	
Authenticity	 and	 agency,	 which	 are	 two	 particular	ways	 of	 thinking	 about	 the	
identity	of	the	self	–	whether	as	something	given	or	achieved,	as	something	natural	
or	 self‐posited	–	 are	 in	 turn	 connected	with	 the	question	of	 the	 identity	of	 the	
human	 being.	 Is	 there	 an	 ‘essence’	 to	 the	 human	 being?	 In	 other	 words,	 does	
philosophical	anthropology	have	a	stable,	 identifiable,	 invariably	fixed	object	of	
study?	 In	 “Making	 the	 Case	 for	 Political	 Anthropology:	 Understanding	 and	
Resolving	 the	 Backlash	 Against	 Liberalism”,	 Rockwell	 F.	 Clancy	 analyses	 the	
contemporary	 backlash	 against	 multiculturalism,	 cosmopolitanism	 and,	 more	
generally,	 inclusive	 liberal	 values	 –	 visible,	 for	 instance,	 in	 forms	 of	 political	
conservatism	and	religious	fundamentalism.	This	backlash,	Clancy	argues,	can	be	
understood	 as	 resulting	 from	 the	 abandonment	 of	 a	 philosophico‐political	
anthropology	by	liberalism,	that	is,	of	a	determinate	conception	of	human	nature	
and,	correlatively,	of	the	human	good	or	the	good	life	for	man.	Yet	is	it	possible,	
indeed,	is	it	even	desirable	to	operate	without	a	conception	of	human	nature	and	
of	 the	 human	 good	 in	 political	 theory?	 Clancy	 demonstrates	 that	 it	 is	 neither	
possible	 nor	 desirable.	 He	 proposes	 a	 conception	 of	 a	 philosophico‐political	
anthropology	that	develops	an	account	of	the	relations	between	the	individual	and	
the	 community	 that	 are	 characterised	 not	 by	 the	 exclusive	 particularism	 of	
fundamentalism	 and	 conservatism	 but,	 rather,	 by	 the	 inclusive	 particularism	
characteristic	of	the	materialist	doctrines	of	Spinoza,	Deleuze	and	Latour	among	
others.	A	materialist	and	non‐essentialist	conception	of	human	nature,	 in	other	
words,	might	help	resolve	the	backlash	against	liberalism	and	serve	as	a	critical	
foundation	and	instrument	for	progressive	political	theories.		
	
Part	 III	 turns	 to	 feminism,	 the	 field	 that	 without	 doubt	 has	 been	 the	 most	
responsive	to	the	shift	of	outlook	experienced	in	the	late	60s	in	the	humanities,	
notably,	 the	 prioritization	 of	 difference	 over	 identity	 in	 the	 discourse	 on	 the	
(gendered)	subject.	Post‐structuralist	authors	such	as	Derrida,	Deleuze,	Foucault,	
Lyotard	and	others	have	each	in	their	own	unique	way	demonstrated	the	limited,	
conditioned	if	not	fictitious	nature	of	the	modern	(Kantian)	notion	of	the	subject	
conceived	as	 a	 sovereign,	 self‐unifying	 subject	 that	 legislates	 to	 itself	 norms	of	
truth	and	action.	This	notion	of	the	subject	has	proven	to	be	inadequate	in	the	face	
of	the	experience	of	our	subjectivity	that	has	come	to	mark	our	‘postmodernity’.	
This	is	an	experience	of	being	decentred	rather	than	unified,	of	heteronomy	rather	
than	 of	 autonomy,	 an	 experience	 of	 our	 subjectivity	 as	 being	 in	 flux.	 In	 “The	
Decentred	Autonomous	Subject”,	Kathy	Buttersworth	considers	the	effects	of	this	
critical	 appraisal	 of	 the	 modern	 subject	 by	 post‐structuralism	 for	 feminism.	
Buttersworth	 contends	 that	 it	 has	 given	 rise,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 to	 an	 anti‐
essentialist	thinking	in	feminist	theory,	something	that	ought	to	be	preserved,	yet,	
on	the	other,	this	critique	has	also	given	rise	to	a	celebration	of	the	fragmented	
self,	which	raises	serious	psychological	and	political	concerns	for	feminism.	In	the	
first	 place,	 some	 post‐structuralist	 authors	 for	 whom	 the	 fragmented	 self	
constitutes	a	positive	and	normative	model	generally	tend	to	underestimate	the	
real	psychological	costs	on	people	who	suffer	 from	psychotic	disorders	such	as	
schizophrenia,	people	who	suffer	 from	a	 fragmentation	of	 self.	 It	 is	 also,	 in	 the	
second	place,	not	 always	 clear	how	such	a	model	 can	be	used	 to	 challenge	 the	
oppressive	 structures	 of	 patriarchy	 and	 capitalism.	 To	 this	 end,	 Buttersworth	
considers	Ricoeur’s	model	of	 the	subject,	which,	 she	argues,	 retains	 the	central	
insights	 of	 the	 post‐structuralist	 critique	 of	 the	 modern	 subject	 whilst	 being	
responsive	to	the	psychological	costs	on	people	who	suffer	from	a	fragmentation	
of	selfhood.	She	argues	that	this	model	can	best	serve	as	a	critical	tool	for	feminist	
theory.		
	
Another	 key	 concern	 in	 feminist	 theory	 is	 the	 differential	 power	 of	 the	 erotic,	
understood	 as	 the	 necessary	 condition	 of	 possibility	 of	 the	 body’s	 ambiguous	
nature,	its	being	at	once	an	object	for	others	and	a	subject	for	itself.	In	“Exploring	
Rape	 as	 an	 Attack	 on	 Erotic	 Goods”,	 Louise	 du	 Toit	 argues	 that	 patriarchy	
appropriates	the	healing,	constructive,	and	liberating	power	of	the	erotic	through	
perversions	and	distortions,	 through	mystifications	and	phantasies	 such	as	 the	
idea	 that	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 ‘overcome’	 one’s	 flesh	 in	 order	 to	 be	 an	 authentic	
subject.	Du	Toit	 considers	 this	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	question	of	what	 is	 sexual	
about	 sexual	 violence,	 how	 a	 sexual	 attack	 differs	 from	 non‐sexual	 forms	 of	
physical	attacks.	She	argues	that	the	patriarchal	framing	of	sexual	attacks	not	only	
reduces	the	human	erotic	to	sexuality;	it	also	robs	the	victims	of	sexual	attacks	of	
the	subjectivity	of	their	body.		
	
In	the	wake	of	Luce	Irigaray’s	work	on	sexuate	difference	and	intersubjectivity,	a	
key	issue	in	feminist	theory	has	been	whether	an	ethics	of	sexual	difference	in	the	
current	 global	 context	 is	 possible.	 Can	 a	 universal,	 and	 not	 simply	 a	 local	 or	
context‐dependent,	ethics	of	sexual	difference	be	articulated?	In	“Making	Mischief:	
Thinking	Through	Women’s	Solidarity	and	Sexuate	Difference	with	Luce	Irigaray	
and	Gayatri	Spivak,”	Laura	Roberts	considers	these	questions.	She	analyses	how	
Spivak	has	mobilized	Irigaray’s	work	on	sexuate	difference	to	address	women’s	
solidarity	and	teases	out	what	this	might	suggest	about	the	possibility	of	cross‐
cultural	communication	between	and	among	women.						
	
Part	IV	turns	to	the	question	of	identity	and	difference	in	the	discourse	on	the	self	
in	the	context	of	race	and	postcolonial	studies.	In	“The	‘Africanness’	of	white	South	
Africans?”,	Sharli	Paphitis	and	Lindsay‐Ann	Kelland	explore	the	way	South	African	
philosophers	have	started	to	pay	attention	to	whiteness,	‘whiteliness’	and	the	role	
of	white	South	Africans	in	political	processes	and	transformation	in	South	Africa.	
In	particular,	 they	examine	 the	questioning	of	Africanness	on	 the	part	of	white	
South	Africans,	and	hence	with	the	way	white	South	Africans	have	been	dealing	
with	 the	 question	 of	 belonging	 to	 and	 of	 being	 at	 home	 in	 their	 South	African	
environment.	In	“Alterity,	Identity,	and	Racial	Difference	in	Levinas”,	Louis	Blond	
critically	assesses	the	charges	that	have	been	brought	against	Levinas’	philosophy	
and	ethics	of	alterity	by	some	of	the	scholarship	in	postcolonial	theory	and	identity	
politics.	 Postcolonial	 theory	 claims	 that	 Levinas’	 deployment	 of	 alterity	
suppresses	the	materiality	and	historicity	of	social	and	political	others	and	in	so	
doing	denies	the	ethnic	and	racial	makeup	–	the	embodiment	–	of	other	identities.	
Louis	examines	Levinas’	understanding	of	alterity	and	identity	and	considers	the	
claim	that	Levinas’	philosophical	position	licenses	the	subdual	of	racial	and	ethnic	
difference.			
	
		
